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A World in Turmoil
Searching for a New International Order

Introductory Remarks.

In his recently published study one of the respected American security analysts, David Rothkopf recommended security policy decision-makers to "resist the temptation to reorganize".[1] He made a reference to the opinion of one experienced official who said to him: "a secret to success is knowing the difference between reprioritizing and reorganizing. Always try reprioritizing first; only if that doesn't work should you consider the latter".[2] In David Rothkopf's view there is a need to understand properly emerging threats and "how we are going to treat them".[3] He is arguing that the United States do not yet have a fully developed sense of new threats. His understanding is that new era of potential cyber-attacks and drons—unlike the nuclear age—may lead us from the concept of *the war to end all wars to the war that never ends*.[4]

However our main political goal in Europe is how to avoid the war and—in practical terms—how to reduce the risk of a military conflict between Russia and NATO? For many post-cold war years such a question was considered as an anachronistic one, irrelevant to the new

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[1] David J. Rothkopf, *National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear.* Public Affairs—New York 2014, p. 357.
[2] Ibidem, p. 357.
[3] Ibidem, p. 362.
[4] Ibidem, p. 363.

realities and in fact overtaken by positive developments of the nineties and the beginning of the first decade of the XXI century.[5]

In recent 20 months the relationship between Russia and the West is deteriorated to an extent that one may say Europeans are confronted with *a fundamental change of circumstances* with all negative implications and by-effects. The most important among them is the deficit of trust and lack of confidence. The question is *how to overcome the present confrontation*? The new tensions are the subject of serious concern both of politicians and security community.[6]

In this context there is a need to respond to the question: what are the major weaknesses of the Euro-Atlantic security order in the second decade of the 21st century?

The sources of new threats

At the intellectual level, experts and scholars would normally answer the question by saying that security institutions, structures and organizations—being static by nature—, address the needs and requirements of the time when they were established. On the other hand, risks, threats and challenges are by their nature dynamic. Consequently, the mandates of security institutions do not correspond to new, changed and changing needs.

Logical and reasonable as it may be, this way of thinking fails to explain the political gist of the matter. After all, some organizations

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[5] Representative for the thinking in 90-ties are two collections of essays: *The Helsinki Process and the Future of Europe.* Edited by Samuel F. Wells. Woodrow Wilson Center Special Studies, № 1, Washington DC 1990 and *International Security in a Time of Change: Threats—Concepts—Institutions.* Edited by Hans J. Giessmann, Roman Kuźniar, Zdzisław Lachowski. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004.
[6] Such a concern is reflected in many reports, i.e. *The ELN Position Paper III produced by Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe.* August 2015.

are set up to accomplish a specific task and fade away once their mandate expires, unless the countries concerned agree on a new mandate in time.

The conflict in Ukraine prompts deep reflection and reaffirms the importance of the military factor and its role in preventing conflicts by deterring potential aggressors in the post-cold war period.

An argument raised quite often is that the world and Europe risk sliding back into a 'cold war'.[7] Such an assertion reflects thinking in terms of the past rather than offering a future-oriented perspective.

Today's threats are of a different nature. During the Cold War, the East-West relations were characterized by ideological hostility which spread to all fields of relations between the two blocs: politics and the economy, military and humanitarian issues. The post-cold war era has de-ideologized the relations among the states. In non-democratic countries it has meant a return to treating the military potential as an instrument of pressure and arm-wrestling and bringing the weaker countries under the control of the stronger ones. Such a code of conduct reflects a return to the old concept of "zones of influence" or "zones of privileged interests", with which—contrary to undertaken commitments—the global powers would have the right to surround themselves.

In fact, the authoritarian regimes do not accept in practice and their official declarations the set of European values. In their view, the commitments taken under the Helsinki Final Act to freedom and civil liberties, and—more broadly—to human rights in fact represent a form of threat, possibly leading to "regime change". Leaders of

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[7] Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, 'Consequences of a New Cold War', in *Survival*, vol. 57, no. 2, April-May 2015, pp. 37-46.

authoritarian governments fear that public anger could trigger a revolt and eventually a regime change. This explains the aversion to values promoted by the process initiated 40 years ago in Helsinki.

As the result of the collapse of totalitarian regimes in Central Europe and Russia, the international security order was best described as being partially uncertain, unstable, ambiguous and unreliable, hence the phenomenon of political unpredictability. It is a state of affairs in which old dangers have not disappeared and continue to persist, while effective mechanisms and procedures are yet to be found to prevent and counter new dangers. These include the stoking of irredentism, and "rebellious wars" which destabilize and weaken countries, allowing the attainment of political, economic and military objectives by proxy, i.e. without deploying one's own military forces in the territory of the country against which these actions are directed.[8]

This development entails the need to increase European defence budgets and adapt them adequately to new threats.[9] This will become possible in practice once resistance to increasing military expenditures inside the European Union is overcome, and the NATO

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[8] In the context of weakening Ukraine, political destabilization and dysfunctionality, and setting in motion the country's disintegration, a number of Russian military magazines (*Независимое военное обозрение, Знание-Власть*) recalled the concept of 'rebellious war' (мятежевойна), which had been put forward by Evgeny Eduardovich Messner (1891-1974). In the 1960s, Messner published in Argentina several studies on a new concept of war: *Мятеж—имя третьей всемирной*; *Всемирная мятежевойна*, published by Kuchkovo Pole, Moscow 2004. The central point made by the author is that "rebellious wars are battles for the souls of a struggling nation." This theory is exemplified by operations in the east and south of Ukraine. For more see: 'Putin walczy o duszę Rosji' ('Putin's Battle for Russia's Soul'), an interview with Adam D. Rotfeld, in *Gazeta Wyborcza,* 26 March 2014, *Polityka Ekstra*, pp. 10-11.

[9] Only four NATO countries spend up to 2014 at least 2 per cent on their armed forces (US military budget accounts for 73 per cent of all spending by 28 NATO countries). Cf. Heather Conley, 'Is it fair to say there is no Euro-Atlantic security approach?', in *CSIS*, Washington D.C., May 16, 2014. Poland joined this group of States in May 2015. Details on military expenditures of the NATO states after NATO Summit in Newport (4-5 Sept. 2014)—see in: *The Wales Pledge Revisited: A Preliminary Analysis of 2015 Budget Decisions in NATO Member States*. Published by European Leadership Network, p. 11; http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2015/02/20/04389e1d/ELN%20NATO%20Budgets%20Brief.pdf (1 May 2015).

and EU countries make a joint decision about their common defence and security strategies.

Back to the Future

There is a recurrent problem at hand. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, different concepts and proposals on how to adapt the old bipolar system to the new reality were put forward.[10] Some questions that were asked 25 years ago have not lost their relevance. Theoreticians and practitioners of international relations had difficulty correctly diagnosing and identifying the essence of the new system.

At the beginning of 1990s, John J. Mearsheimer advanced a concept that after the cold war Europe was entering a time of instability that would be marked by traditional conflicts rooted in history.[11] Like many other scholars, Mearsheimer believed that the cold war rules had saved Europe from a hot war, while the disappearing bipolar system was by definition more likely to ensure stability than any multipolar system.[12]

In the mid-1990s, the French scholar Pierre Hassner offered an analysis of six models of the post-cold war evolution of the international system.[13] His two models assumed that conflicts could

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[10] For an attempt at a systemic approach to the analysis of the new reality, see the collection of papers by 28 authors from the United States, Germany, France, the UK, Russia, Sweden, Italy, Canada and Poland: Hans J. Giessmann, Roman Kuźniar, Zdzisław Lachowski (eds.), *International Security in a Time of Change: Threats—Concepts—Institutions,* Festschrift for Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2004. See also: Michael Stürmer: *What Kind of European Architecture?* In: *The Helsinki Process and the Future of Europe*, op. cit., pp.69-76.

[11] J. J. Mearsheimer: 'Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War', in *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 11 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.

[12] See: Adam D. Rotfeld, 'New security structures in Europe: concepts, proposals and decisions', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, Oxford, 1991, pp. 585-600.

[13] Pierre Hassner, 'Beyond the Three Traditions. The Philosophy of War and Peace in Historical Prespective', in *International Affairs*, 1994, vol. 70, no. 4.

be overcome and prevented and that cooperation would prevail. The other two options of possible post-cold war changes were based on a concept of permanent rivalry among countries or groups of countries ('multipolarity'), or on the anticipated 'clash of civilizations'[14]; finally, the last two models posited an enduring opposition between the global centre and peripheries. According to this theory, the rich North would curb its contacts with the poor South so as to safeguard stability and prosperity, while, at the same time, neutralizing the negative effects of 'fringe' conflicts and striving to de-escalate or 'freeze' them.[15] Hassner assumed that if put into practice, this model would divide for good the world into two parts which would gradually drift apart. In his view, after the cold war international relations more than ever are governed by the principle: "everything is connected with everything else, but nobody with anybody else."[16]

In the 1990s, analysts were by and large right in assuming that even as globalization processes accelerated, the international system needed new globally applicable universal norms in order to function. The strength of this argument was somewhat weakened by its proponents who assumed that inter-state regulations would offer solutions, without realising that today most of the problems and potential conflicts emerge within states and not between them.[17]

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[14] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,* New York, 1996.

[15] Max Singer, Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil,* New York, 1993.

[16] Hassner, op. cit., p. 45.

[17] I have pointed this out for the first time in my essay 'The fundamental change and the new security agenda', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1992*, Oxford, 1992, pp. 1-8. I argued that the line between what constitutes internal and external threats was being blurred and becoming fuzzy. My understanding was that the weakness of the emerging new international system stems from the fact that "(…) the international system and the means available to international security organizations have been tailored to resolving conflicts *between* states, not *within* them": 'The new security environment', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, Oxford, 1993, p. 2. For more on this, see A.D. Rotfeld, *Euro-Atlantic Security: Continuity and Change,* Warsaw, Academy of National Defence, April 2013.

The New Type of Conflicts

In the Euro-Atlantic space the blurring of the line of division between what is external and what is 'essentially' internal ("matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" and cannot be formally subject to an intervention by the UN or any other country)[18] ceased to exist.

Most of the conflicts erupted not between the states but within them. The international system that took shape after the end of the cold war invoked common liberal and democratic values, as opposed to the order that was based on mutual deterrence. The principles and norms that were invoked implied a democratic political system, the rule of law, political pluralism, market economy, freedom of speech, respect for civil rights and liberties, tolerance, and respect for human rights in all spheres of human activity. It was assumed that bipolarity based on the balance of power and the philosophy of exclusiveness would make a way for a new order founded on interdependence, the harmonization of interests, and inclusiveness in place of exclusion. Moral and ethical values, and the rule of law, rather than military might and economic clout were to play a central role. In other words, the new international order—unlike bipolarity in the past—was to be founded not on the use of force but on the force of law.

The concept of promoting democracy and "regime change" around the world—from the oppressive dictatorships to the democracies based on rule of law—gained popularity. The 2000 Warsaw Meeting of 108 foreign ministers adopted a document *Towards a Community*

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[18] Cf. Art. 2.7 of the *Charter of the United Nations*.

of Democracies, which set out an action plan for countries whose governments respected democratic principles and procedures, and for countries which declared their aspirations to a democratic form of government.[19]

Democratic and liberal thinkers, as well as decision-makers, tend to believe that agreements and normative regulations suffice to charter a new international security order.

It is not so.

Institutions vs Security

The trust placed on mechanisms and institutions and the belief that they can be relied upon leads to bitter disappointments when well-established instruments fail a stress test during serious tensions between countries, and in crises situations. This is because the effectiveness of any security system depends on the state's willingness and commitment to uphold values and interests which have justified the need of setting up specific structures and institutions.

In fact, institutions are called into being at a given moment in history and they respond to the needs and requirements of the time and the conditions which made a specific form of organizing security possible and necessary. However, some institutions lose their importance, get

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[19] The aim of the meeting of 108 foreign ministers in Warsaw was to demonstrate the willingness to shape an international security order founded on democratic principles. The conference was called on the initiative of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek. The meeting's outcome, the Warsaw Declaration entitled "Towards a Community of Democracies" (Warsaw, May 2000), was published in a special edition of the quarterly *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* and in the original English-language version (27 June 2000) in the *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, vol. 9, n° 2 (2000) Supplement.

marginalized or incorporated into other structures as time goes by and new historical circumstances emerge.[20]

It is not the formal or organizational aspects that decide whether a security institution is significant and viable, but rather the political commitment of countries and their security interest in using the tools that make it easier to carry out tasks which justified the creation of a specific structure to begin with. In other words, institutional shortcomings and organizational deficits should not be viewed as the main reason for the ineffectiveness of a security system.

A weak point of the current system regionally and globally is the false assumption that the member states of the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe adhere to the same values defined as universal or common European values. The recent crisis in and around Ukraine demonstrates that these liberal values are, in fact, not universally recognized.

Proposals and Projects

In 2008-2012, the academic community in Russia launched a project aimed at finding a new formula for cooperative security. An intention was to conceptualize the proposal made by President Dmitry Medvedev for a new European Security Treaty.[21] One has to note in this context the publications by the Institute of Contemporary Development. INSOR pursued close cooperation with the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the serious

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[20] The Western European Union (WEU) is an example of a security institution which never played the role its member states wanted to assign to it upon signing the Treaty of Brussels (1948). The WEU's tasks and functions were fulfilled by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in accordance with the Washington Treaty (1949), and by the European Union following the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht, which became effective on 1 November 1993.

[21] See more: Adam D. Rotfeld, 'Does Europe Need a New Security Architecture?' in *OSCE Yearbook 2009*,, Hamburg, 2010, pp. 23-42.

branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences concerned with social sciences. Both research teams would formulate concepts based on the assumption that Russia would embark on a liberal and democratic path of development.[22]

In their study *The Architecture of Euro-Atlantic Security*[23] the INSOR team wrote:

"Our objective interest today is to generate not so much [a] fear of Russia (because it is strong and barely containable) but [a] respect towards it (because it is strong and keen to pursue responsible and cooperative policies)."[24]

Unfortunately, the choice made by the Russian political leadership was a different one. Decisions were taken to construct the national defence and security based not on interdependence but on the use of force, not on predictability and cooperation but on intimidation, extortion, and imposing on neighbours the concept of "limited sovereignty" and making them dependent on Russia's strategy and interests.

Poland and all the other Western democracies were engaged genuinely in establishing partnership with Russia based on mutual respect and partnership. Unfortunately their efforts were not reciprocated.

There is a growing understanding among the most eminent scholars taking part in intellectual debates in the West that the foundation of a new global system and world order must take account of the fact that

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[22] Two publications in particular deserved an attention: Igor Y. Yurgens, Alexander A. Dynkin, Vladimir G. Baranovsky (eds.), *Arhitektura evroatlanticheskoy bezopasnosti* (*Architecture of Euro-Atlantic Security*), Ekon-Inform, Moscow, 2009; and the monograph A.A. Dynkin and I.S. Ivanov (eds.) *Evroatlanticheskoe prostranstvo bezopasnosti* (*Euro-Atlantic Security Space*), IMEMO, Moscow, 2011.
[23] *Arhitektura evroatlanticheskoy bezopasnosti*, op. cit.
[24] Ibidem, p. 117.

liberal democracy and its values and principles are recognized only by the transatlantic community of countries.[25]

In the current situation different working groups of intellectuals, thinkers and scholars and former politicians should make the decision-makers aware that the time is ripe of revaluating the old concepts and working out new concepts that meet the current needs. One may make a reference here to the Aspen Ministers Forum (AMF) and the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI). A new initiative is taken up also by the European Leadership Network (ELN) which has established Task Force on Cooperation and produced the paper on *Greater Europe.*

The idea proposed by ELN has developed the old concept that security has to be based on cooperation. It requires innovative thinking among the managing executive groups of both transatlantic security and defence organisations[26]. The starting point for the effective implementation of the common strategy of building sustainable peace and security in Europe should be a common perception and understanding of threats by all countries of the transatlantic community.

The ELN authors[27] recommend in the context of Ukraine's crisis the exercise of self-restraint and the observance of the following rules:

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[25] See more, Trine Flockhart, Charles A. Kupchan and others (eds.), *Liberal Order in a Post-Western World,* Transatlantic Academy, Washington, DC, May 2014. *We need to talk about Europe,* European Identity Debates at the Council of Europe 2013-14. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Sept. 2014.

[26] This concept was discussed in Warsaw (30 May 2014) on the basis of the *A Task Force Position Paper on Crisis Management in Europe in the Context of Events in Ukraine.*

[27] The works were performed by former politicians and intellectuals from the United Kingdom (Des Browne, former Secretary of Defence and Malcolm Rifkind, former Secretary of Defence and Foreign Affairs), France (Paul Quilès and Hervé Morin—former ministers of defence), Germany (Volker Rühe, former minister of defence), Spain (Ana de Palacio, former minister of foreign affairs), Turkey and a group of former Russian politicians (Igor Ivanov, Vitali Trubnikov, Igor Yurgens, Anatoly Adamishin and others). Both co-chairs of the Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters took part in the works of that team, academician Anatoly V. Torkunov and professor Adam D. Rotfeld.

- Exercise full military and political restraint and take steps to encourage and ensure the military and political restraint of all of their relevant allies and partners in the wider region;

- Embrace increased military-to-military communication, information exchange and transparency measures in the interests of all and;

- Engage in direct dialogue with each other as an accompaniment to a dialogue between the parties inside Ukraine and between Ukrainian parties and other actors outside the country.

The most recent Position Paper III of July 2015—*Avoiding War in Europe: How to reduce the risk of a military encounter between Russia and NATO* adapted some previous concepts to the new realities.[28]

An intellectual weakness of this and some other papers reflect rather an operational than conceptual way of thinking. More reactive than active approach in a search for a new international order. On the other hand the way how the Ukraine conflict will be solved has to be seen as a signal not just of regional but rather global significance and not only operational by its nature but a systemic and influencing the future character of the international system.[29]

Polycentric World

Security is subject to change. New powers emerge next to old powers. By their nature, they call into question *the status quo* and seek to obtain a position and influence in the regional and global system,

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[28] See: *ELN Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe Position Paper III—Avoiding War in Europe: How to Reduce the Risk of a Military Encounter Between Russia and NATO?* July 2015.
[29] Ulrich Speck: *Russia's Challenge to the International Order. Power Vertical or Power Horizontal?* http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-world/russias-challenge-international-order

which will allow them to pursue their strategic interests. This natural dynamic of the world system generates international tensions. It inevitably leads to a change of the balance of power.

A new cooperative order which would reflect the complexity and interdependence of the modern world should help advance continuous peaceful transformation, which in practice means that the importance and role of 'old powers' will decrease, while the growing clout of 'emerging powers' will be accepted.

European security in the second decade of the 21st century does not fit the concept of polarity: it is neither an international order ruled by one hegemon (unipolar model), nor an order recognizing the right of global powers to maintain their own 'zones of influence' or 'spheres of privileged interests' (multipolar model). What has been taking shape after the collapse of the bipolar model is a polycentric system where control and power are dispersed. As for the rules and norms which were agreed in the past and adjusted in an adequate way to a world that no longer exists, there is a need to adapt the rules and the code of conduct to suit the new reality and conditions.

Thus defined, a polycentric system assumes the world is heterogeneous rather than homogenous. This, in turn, means that we must draw up and accept, by way of consensus, new rules arising from the political diversity of the international community in the second decade of the 21st century.[30]

One has also to take under consideration a traditional lack of interest of the great powers to rely on multilateral security institutions unless they could be used as instruments in pursuing their strategies. In other

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[30] Cf. Charles A. Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*, Oxford/New York, 2012, and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Reordering Order: Global Change and the Need for a New Normative Consensus', in *Liberal Order in a Post-Western World*, op. cit., pp. 3-12.

words, the great powers as a rule have an inclination to instrumentalize multilateral institutions in their own interests but do not have an interest to serve as instruments for them. In this respect the OSCE experience is not an exceptional one.

Concluding Remarks

The OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons is established with a mandate to respond the question: How European Security can be rediscovered as a common project. The common wisdom popular among international security experts is that there is a need to strengthen the existing multilateral institution with an aim to make them more effective. The other school of thinking is that one should convene a new Great Congress (like historical summits in Vienna, Versailles, Potsdam or Helsinki) and elaborate a kind of a European Security Treaty which should contain new principles, norms and procedures or a fundamentally new Code of Conduct.

In my view, however, there is no deficit in Europe of multilateral institutions, political and legal norm and procedures and binding rules addressed to the States in their mutual relationship. The problems in Europe emerged not for the lack of documents but for the deficit of mutual trust and confidence.

The institutions should follow the problems. Therefore the Panel of Eminent Persons in its work on Final Report has to be focused on the origin and depth of the crisis in European Security. The suggested remedies, as a rule, do not correspond to new realities, new risks and challenges. There is no shortage of contacts, including high-level meetings. There is an urgent need to find a way how to rebuild trust and confidence.

The proposed recommendations should be adequate to the new challenges. The search for a European Security as a Common Project should be less oriented to the new rhetoric and technicalities but to the core of matters. The problems were originated *not between* Russia and the West but *within* Russia and *within* the West. What has to be done? In general terms one has to recommend to de-escalate and demilitarize security policy.

The priorities of strategies for co-operation and joint solutions under the OSCE auspices should include in 2015 immediate steps and measures aimed at:

First, prevention of a direct military conflict between the West and Russia;

Second, development of political, economic and military conditions for a durable and just peaceful settlement of the crisis in and around Ukraine;

Third, strengthening of the OSCE Mission to Ukraine and establishing a multilateral mechanism to monitor and supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement (Minsk II);

Fourth, elaborating a framework for the lasting political settlement of the Ukraine crisis within the new European security order based on:

- Confirmation of the OSCE Decalogue of principles—sovereignty of States; non-use of force; inviolability of frontiers; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation among States; and fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law;

- The core and fundamental political component of a new European order has to be both the inviolability of national territories of states and the incontestability of internal political order;

- Elaboration of innovative and adequate to the new risks and threats military and non-military confidence- and security-building measures, incl. rejection of some old ideas of zones of influence or privileged interests for great powers as irreconcilable with the principle of sovereignty and equal rights of all the OSCE participating states;

- Revitalization and reactivation of the negotiation on the European conventional arms control process and on new sets of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM)s under the OSCE auspices.[31]

- Adjustment of the existing institutions and organs to the new tasks and challenges ("not everything has to be reinvented, but many things could be rediscovered"[32]). Some OSCE mechanisms could be up-graded (i.e. the OSCE Permanent Council composed of heads of missions in Vienna may be transformed and reconstructed as the Euro-Atlantic Security Forum on a higher political level) and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) mandate might be strengthened within a possible new Center for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management[33].

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[31] As suggested in the German SWP Report by Markus Kaim, Hanns W. Maull and Kirsten Westphal, 'The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: Three Principles for a New Beginning', in *SWP Comments* 18, Berlin, March 2015, p.5.

[32] Ibidem, p.7.

[33] Max van der Stoel, the first CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was right in his judgement: "The durable prevention (…) requires a long-term perspective. It involves building a viable democracy and its institutions, creating confidence between the government and the population,

The time is ripe to initiate the process of negotiations with an aim to find the common security denominator for the West and Russia in the form of a new security arrangement. Such a negotiated compromise has to reconcile both different threat perceptions and adversary national security interests. It has to be done in a world which is more connected, more contested and more complex one. **Therefore the new European and global security system has to be more integrated and interconnected. Since Europe and the world are more fragmented and contested there is a need to take under consideration the existing polyphony and demonstrate both flexibility and sense of direction reflected in a new set of priorities.**

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structuring the protection and promotion of human rights, the elimination of all forms of gender or racial discrimination and respect for minorities". In: *The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the CSCE,* the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1994, p. 53.